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Abstract
This paper considers a conditional cash transfer program targeting
poor households in small rural villages and studies the effects of the geo-
graphic proximity between villages on individual enrollment decisions.
Exploiting variations in the treatment status across contiguous villages
generated by the randomized evaluation design, the paper finds that the
additional effect stemming from the local density of neighboring recipi-
ents amounts to roughly one third of the direct effect of program receipt.
Importantly, these spatial externalities are concentrated among children
from beneficiary households. This suggests that the intervention has en-
hanced educational aspirations by triggering social interactions among the
targeted population.
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1 Introduction
Demand-side schooling interventions are now widespread in developing coun-
tries, and the available empirical evidence suggests that such interventions can
have large effects (e.g. Glewwe and Kremer [2006]). Cash subsidies, in partic-
ular, have been found to be effective devices for encouraging the human capital
investments of poor households (e.g. Parker et al. [2008]; Fiszbein and Schady
[2009]). Recent studies have also documented that such programs may posi-
tively affect the schooling behaviors of non-participants through non-market, or
social, interactions (Bobonis and Finan [2009]; Kremer et al. [2009]; Lalive and
Cattaneo [2009]). However, there is still much to learn about those externalities
and the related social dynamics prompted by these policies.
The social networks which underlie policy spillovers are notably assumed
to be pre-existing, or exogenous, to those interventions. Yet, cash or in-kind
transfer programs create many opportunities for information sharing and inter-
actions between beneficiaries, notably women who are the primary recipients
of the transfers and regularly encounter during program operations. Moreover
the targeting of those interventions implies that participants often have similar
socio-economic backgrounds and are thus likely to identify the ones to the oth-
ers [Akerlof, 1997]. Hence, human capital interventions of this sort are likely to
activate social interactions among groups of program beneficiaries and produce
externalities that would not occur were individuals treated in isolation.
Assessing and quantifying the implications of these interactions is impor-
tant from both a policy and an analysis perspective. First, monetary incentives
alone may not suffice to overcome the main constraints on schooling decisions.
Interventions that spur interactions and in turn affect beneficiaries’ preferences
and aspirations for their children’s education may have larger effects. Second,
the strength of those interactions should depend on the density of beneficiaries
in a given area. The targeting of a program is thus likely to affect their ex-
tent and be crucial for its effectiveness. Third, treatment density will invariably
change with the scaling-up of the intervention. Interferences between benefi-
ciaries would thus make it difficult to extrapolate the policy impacts from pilot
evaluation studies, which usually investigate small subsets of the eligible popu-
lation in specific geographic areas.
In this paper, we consider a cash transfer program which targets poor house-
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holds in small villages located in rural areas of Mexico and evaluate the effects
of the geographic proximity between villages on individual school enrollment
decisions. More specifically, we construct a simple empirical framework which
allows us to disentangle the direct effects of the incentives produced by receipt
of the program from the indirect effects which originate from the density of
neighboring participants. We next investigate whether externalities arise in this
setting because of program-related social interactions or due to other changes
associated with variations in the local density of the program across village
neighborhoods.
The policy we consider in this study is the Progresa program. Initiated in
1997 and still ongoing, Progresa is a large-scale social program that aims to
foster the accumulation of human capital in the poorest communities of Mexico
by providing cash transfers, which are conditional on specific family members’
behavior in the key areas of health and education. Beyond direct economic
incentives, two features of this intervention are propitious to enhance benefi-
ciaries’ demand for schooling through social interactions. First, the multiple
and unbundled components of the program, each of which provides cash trans-
fers conditional on a different household behavior, make partial take-up possi-
ble, whereby some households with children not currently attending school take
part to the program. Second, high program coverage coupled with the clustering
of localities implied by the geographic targeting entails a very high density of
beneficiary villages within treated regions. In this setting, the periodic encoun-
ters of beneficiaries who live in neighboring villages induced by the program’s
operations may enhance views and aspirations regarding education among the
targeted population and persuade some initially reluctant parents to enroll their
children in school.
Exploiting the randomized evaluation design and the clustered spatial distri-
bution of the villages in our sample, we causally identify program externalities
across neighboring villages. In each village neighborhood, the allocation of
evaluation localities between the treatment and control group is random. These
exogenous variations enable us to identify the spillovers induced by the density
of program delivery at any distance from the villages in our sample.
We find evidence of a positive and robust effect of the local density of the
program on secondary school participation decisions. The magnification effect
of the intervention is large, amounting to roughly one third of the direct program
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impact, and the effect is stronger for girls than for boys. Crucially, these spatial
externalities appear to be concentrated among children from beneficiary house-
holds; there is no evidence of such effects for children in the control group and
for those in treated villages who are not eligible to receive the program’s bene-
fits. This remarkable heterogeneity sheds some light on the mechanisms behind
program externalities. We argue that, while interactions through pre-existing
social networks should affect all households that share local resources, social
interactions that are restricted to program beneficiaries are likely to be directly
spurred by the intervention. To further corroborate this hypothesis, we check
that our results are not driven by any other heterogeneity associated with local
treatment density, such as variations in program implementation or in the supply
of education.
Those findings suggest that the program may have served as a vehicle to
spread positive attitudes toward schooling through social interactions, thereby
increasing recipients’ demand for education. Accordingly, we find that subjec-
tive measures of parents’ aspirations for their daughters’ schooling are positively
related to the local density of neighboring participants. This effect also only ac-
crues to eligible households who reside in treated villages.
This paper builds on the empirical literature that seeks to quantify the pres-
ence and magnitude of externalities due to social interactions within policy in-
terventions. Manski [2000] and Moffitt [2001] advocate the use of experimental
data in order to resolve the identification issues that stem from the endogenous
formation of groups of peers and the simultaneous determination of outcomes
for individuals and their peers (the ”reflection problem”). Accordingly, recent
studies have employed random variations in the composition of groups of peers
to estimate the influence of group behaviors on individual responses to policies.
For instance, Duflo and Saez [2003] study the transmission of information in re-
tirement plan decisions, Miguel and Kremer [2004] consider cross-school exter-
nalities of a deworming program on school participation, and Kling et al. [2007]
investigate residential neighborhood peer effects within a housing voucher pro-
gram.
Some authors have studied the effects of externalities on schooling responses
to the Progresa program by examining the roles of pre-existing social networks.
In particular, Bobonis and Finan [2009] and Lalive and Cattaneo [2009] exploit
the randomized design to identify spillover effects from eligible to ineligible
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children within beneficiary villages. While Angelucci et al. [2010] identify fam-
ily networks and find that the program raises secondary enrollment only among
beneficiary households that are embedded in such a network.
Other recent research puts forward the role of interactions between bene-
ficiaries and program staff as an important channel driving the effects of con-
ditional schooling interventions. More specifically, Macours and Vakis [2009]
report that interactions with program leaders increased the aspirations and hu-
man capital investments of beneficiaries of a cash transfer program in Nicaragua.
Similarly Chiapa et al. [2010] find that the mandated exposure to doctors and
nurses increases parental aspirations about children’s academic achievements
among Progresa beneficiaries.
This paper also relates to studies seeking to understand what features of
the design of cash transfer interventions account for the observed outcomes.
For instance, Filmer and Schady [2011] find that, in a Cambodian program,
modest transfers had a substantial impact on school attendance, while somewhat
larger amounts did not raise attendance rates above this level. There seems to be
amounting evidence that schooling interventions can have effects through other
channels than relaxed liquidity constraints or reduced costs of schooling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting of the pro-
gram, notably the factors of interactions between beneficiaries, and the features
of the data which allow us to empirically investigate the presence and effects
of those interactions. Section 3 presents the empirical framework we employ to
disentangle the impacts which are due to the direct effects of program benefit in-
centives from the indirect effects which arise from the density of neighboring re-
cipients. Section 4 reports the main findings of program externalities on school
participation decisions. In Section 5, we provide some additional evidence that
corroborates our interpretation of social interactions between beneficiaries and
rules out alternative channels. Section 6 concludes.
2 Non-Market Interactions between Program Ben-
eficiaries
In this section, we first present the program features which are propitious for so-
cial interactions between beneficiary households living in neighboring villages.
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We then describe our sample and the characteristics of the data which allow us to
evaluate empirically how those social interactions affect the schooling responses
to the program.
2.1 Program Features
Initiated in 1997 and still ongoing, Progresa is a large-scale social program that
aims to foster the accumulation of human capital in the poorest communities
of Mexico by providing cash transfers, which are conditional on specific family
members’ behavior in the key areas of nutrition, health, and education.1 Mone-
tary benefits are channeled through two distinct components. First, the scholar-
ships and school supplies, for children aged less than 17 years, are conditional
on regular attendance of one of the four last grades of primary schooling (grades
3 to 6) or one of the three grades of junior secondary schooling (grades 7 to 9).
These transfers increase with school grade and are larger for girls than for boys
for grades 7 to 9. Second, the fixed-value food stipends are conditional on all
family members making regular visits to local health centers for checkups and
preventive care. Both transfers are delivered to the female head of the house-
hold (usually the mother) on a bimonthly basis after verification of each family
member’s attendance in the relevant facility (school or health clinic).
The Progresa program is targeted both at the village and household lev-
els. During the first years of the program, poor rural households were selected
through a centralized process which encompasses three main steps. First, vil-
lages are ranked by a composite index of marginality, which is computed using
information on socio-economic characteristics and access to the program in-
frastructures from the censuses of 1990 and 1995.2 Second, potentially eligible
localities were grouped based on geographical proximity, and relatively isolated
communities were excluded from the selection process. Third, eligible house-
holds were selected using information on covariates of poverty obtained from a
field census conducted in each locality before its incorporation into the program.
The program began in 1997 in 6,300 localities with about 300,000 benefi-
ciary households, and expanded rapidly during the following years. In 1998,
it was delivered to 34,400 localities (1.6 million households), and in 1999, the
1For more details on Progresa, see Skoufias [2001].
2Localities with fewer than 50 or more than 2,500 inhabitants were excluded during the first
years of the program.
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number increased to 48,700 localities (2.3 million households). Geographical
expansion in rural areas continued in subsequent years, and by 2001 coverage
reached 67,500 localities (3.1 million households). Urban areas were included
after that year, and the program has come to cover more than 5 millions house-
holds in the following years.
An experimental evaluation of the program was conducted during its phase
of geographical expansion in rural areas from 1997 until late 1999. A random
sample of 506 villages was drawn from a set of program-eligible localities sit-
uated in seven central states of Mexico. Among those villages, 320 localities
were randomly assigned to the treatment group and started receiving the pro-
gram’s benefits in March–April 1998. The remaining 186 localities formed the
control group and were thus prevented from receiving the program’s benefits
until November 1999.
2.1.1 Partial Take-Up
The two transfer components are unbundled. Households declared eligible to
receive benefits can take up food stipends, scholarships, or both. They can also
chose to receive the scholarships for some but not all of their eligible children.
Beyond transfer amounts, take-up decisions largely depend on the tightness of
the conditions attached to each grant component. While nominally conditional,
a substantial fraction of the transfers is de facto unconditional. In particular, the
conditions attached to the food stipends and scholarships for primary school-
level children do not seem to incur a high cost to households.
At the opposite, the transfers conditionality is actually binding for many
households whose eligible school-age children would have not gone to school
in the absence of the program. The poor might have low educational aspira-
tions, in part because their own experiences and those of their peers can suggest
that escaping poverty through the acquisition of education is not a feasible op-
tion [Ray, 2006]. Relatedly, parents (and children) might underestimate the
actual returns to education since they mainly rely on information on the returns
gathered within their own community [Jensen, 2010]. Finally, the opportunity
costs of schooling may be too high and the financial incentives provided by the
secondary school transfer judged insufficient to modify enrollment decisions.
For boys, who are more likely to work for a wage, the secondary school trans-
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fer amounts to only around two-thirds of full-time child wage [Schultz, 2004],
whereas adolescent girls may be difficult to replace in performing household
chores such as the care of younger siblings [Dubois and Rubio-Codina, 2010].
Partial take-up of program benefits is thus likely in this setting, whereby
some eligible households comply with the food stipend conditions but do not
enroll some or all their children in school. However, once they are incorporated
into the program, recipients can further adjust their behaviors by enrolling some
of their program-eligible children.
2.1.2 Village Neighborhoods
The dramatic expansion of the program during its first years, coupled with the
clustering of localities as implied by the targeting mechanism, means that vil-
lages belonging to the evaluation sample (see below) were literally surrounded
by other beneficiary localities. In late 1997, there was on average less than one
beneficiary locality within walking distance (5 kilometers) from each evaluation
village. Due to the scaling-up of the program during that period, this figure had
increased to 8.6 by 1998 and to 10.6 by 1999.
These figures suggest that the topography of the area covered by the program
consists of village clusters with a quasi-continuum of dwellings, rather than
isolated villages. In this context, non-market interactions among neighbors are
likely to occur within but also across villages.
The involvement of beneficiaries residing in the same geographic cluster into
joint program operations reinforces the likelihood of interactions among benefi-
ciaries of different nearby villages. Two sorts of such operations are noteworthy.
First, basic infrastructures are shared by several villages belonging to the same
program-incorporated clusters. For instance, only 13 percent of the villages in
the evaluation sample have a health clinic. Yet, 68 percent of these localities
have access to such a facility within 5 kilometers. Similarly, most localities do
not have a junior secondary school (only 17 percent have one in the sample),
while 93 percent of them have access to one or more of those schools situated
in other villages within 5 kilometers.
Second, transfers are delivered through temporary and mobile outposts lo-
cated in junction beneficiary localities that serve a number of neighboring com-
munities and further assist beneficiaries by conveying information about the pro-
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gram.
In this setting, program beneficiaries are likely to interact in health facil-
ities, transfer collection points, and common meetings, and those non-market
interactions can modify the decisions regarding secondary schooling of some
households that are already in the program but have not yet taken scholarships
and enrolled all their eligible children.
2.2 Data and Sample Description
We employ three of the five rounds of the subsequent evaluation surveys, col-
lected respectively in October 1997 (baseline and first round), October 1998
(third round), and November 1999 (fifth round).3 The resulting dataset contains
detailed information on the socioeconomic characteristics of a panel of house-
holds who reside in the evaluation localities. To investigate the effects of the
geographic proximity between villages on schooling decisions, we complement
the evaluation dataset with information from a census of localities with the exact
latitudes and longitudes of rural localities in Mexico, which allows us to identify
the geographic location of the evaluation localities.
The evaluation surveys were intended to cover all the inhabitants of the lo-
calities under study. However, a small share of the population was not inter-
viewed at baseline and there were some changes in the village populations, so
the total number of households observed in the data is 24,077 in October 1997,
25,846 in October 1998, and 26,972 in November 1999. There is also some at-
trition, as 8.4 percent of the 1997 households cannot be followed and matched in
all three rounds of the survey.4 Because of the non-negligible attrition rate, we
do not match individuals in all three rounds of the survey; instead, we consider
an unrestricted pooled sample of all valid child observations and use the panel
sample only for robustness checks.5
At baseline (1997), 60 percent of the households in evaluation localities were
3We have discarded the March 1998 and June 1999 rounds of the surveys in order to avoid
seasonal variations in enrollment rates.
4Attrition is undoubtedly due in part to migration out of the villages, but it mainly reflects
errors in identification codes that occurred for a few enumerators in the second round.
5Age limitations on the children reporting in the subsequent surveys, which may make the
oldest and youngest groups in the matched panel sample unrepresentative, also contribute to
attrition in the sample of children. Our main estimates are nevertheless very similar when we
consider the panel sample; see Section 3.
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classified as eligible to receive program benefits.6 We consider the sample of
children who live in eligible households, who are less than 16 years old in 1998
and less than 18 years old in 1999 and have completed at least the second and
no more than the eighth grade, and are thus eligible to the program. Our main
sample contains 23,841 primary school children and 13,992 secondary school
children (6,784 girls and 7,198 boys) observed in one or both of the two post-
implementation periods (October 1998 or November 1999).
Pre-program school enrollment is high at the primary level. It is 91 percent
for both boys and girls, but drops sharply at junior secondary secondary level
to 61 percent for boys and 50 percent for girls. Among those who have com-
pleted primary school, 33 percent of eligible boys are reported to be working
for a wage or in the family business, and 22 percent of girls perform domestic
work.7 Enrollment in secondary school is thus the most problematic decision
and, not surprisingly, corresponds to the grade levels at which the program has
its greatest impact, especially for girls [Schultz, 2004].
Additional data from the program administrative monitoring allows doc-
umenting the take-up of the different components. The take-up of the food
stipend is almost complete: 97 percent and 98 percent of eligible households
did take those transfers in 1998 and 1999, respectively. Among those benefi-
ciaries, take-up of scholarships amounts to 88 percent for households with only
primary school children, but drops to 74 percent for those with only secondary
school children.8 Interestingly, 26 percent of households take up the educa-
tional component of the program for some but not all of their program-eligible
children.
Those figures suggest that cash grants do not overcome all constraints on
school enrollment decisions. Indeed, parents’ aspirations toward their children’s
education might be too low for them to take up the scholarships. Before the
intervention, 8 percent of the households expect their daughters to terminate
school after completing the primary level and 38 percent after junior secondary.
6About 12 percent of the households were classified as “non-poor” at baseline but were later
reclassified as eligible. To avoid arbitrary classifications, we exclude those households from our
analysis.
7Unfortunately, the sequence of questions on child work is not identical over the three
rounds of the survey. Information on domestic work activities was not collected before Oc-
tober 1998.
8Logistic and administrative inefficiencies might also have caused some delays in the deliv-
ery of scholarships in some areas. See Section 5.
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Only 54 percent of parents desire a high education degree (senior secondary and
college) for their daughters. The corresponding figures are only slightly higher
for boys.
Although this information may internalize some of the constraints on school-
ing choices, it should at least partly capture parental preferences with respect
to education. This is confirmed by basic regressions results (available upon re-
quest) showing that parents with lower levels of education tend to place a signif-
icantly lower value on their children’s academic achievements after controlling
for family income and village fixed effects.
Given the proximity in the underlying population of beneficiary villages dis-
cussed above, many of the sampled evaluation villages are located very close the
ones to the others. Table 1 reports the unconditional and conditional distribu-
tions of the numbers of other neighboring evaluation villages within 5, 10 and
20 kilometers.9 Indeed, 40 percent (80 percent) of the villages in the sample
have at least another evaluation locality situated within 5 kilometers (10 kilo-
meters). Among the localities with at least one neighboring evaluation villages,
there are on average 1.5 (3.0) other evaluation villages situated within 5 kilo-
meters (10 kilometers), roughly two thirds of which are randomly assigned to
the treatment group. While the mass of the distribution is concentrated at one
nearby treatment village when considering a radius of 5 kilometers, it shifts to
three or more nearby treatment villages when extending the neighborhood to 20
kilometers.
Due to the sampling design, the density of nearby evaluation localities should
mirror to a large extent the targeting of the program. To illustrate this, Table 2
presents baseline means and standard deviations of various covariates of poverty
across quartiles of the number of evaluation localities in 5-kilometer neighbor-
hoods. The proximity between evaluation villages seems associated with poorer
and less educated households as reflected by the lower household income and
lower maternal education in the upper quartiles. Villages with more numerous
neighboring evaluation villages also have a higher marginality index (the com-
posite index used in the geographic targeting of the program) and are less likely
9We define neighborhoods using only geodesic distances from each evaluation village and
do not take into account local geography (natural obstacles or communication axes such as
mountains, rivers, or valleys) or transportation networks. This restriction can potentially intro-
duce some measurement error into neighborhood characteristics and generate some attenuation
biases in our estimates.
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to have a secondary school. Further, secondary schools in areas with several
evaluation villages tend to be more crowded as indicated by the higher students-
per-teacher and students-per-class ratios.
3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we first discuss a simple regression framework which allows us to
disentangle and quantify the relative importance of the effects stemming from
the local density of neighboring recipients, with respect to the direct effects
of program receipt. We then develop a test for investigating the mechanisms
through which the local density of the program affects schooling responses.
3.1 Direct and Indirect Treatment Effects
Our identification strategy exploits two features of the program evaluation de-
sign: the village-level random assignment to treatment and the proximity be-
tween evaluation villages. After conditioning on the number of neighboring
evaluation localities, the parceling of those assigned to the treatment and con-
trol groups is random. This enables us to identify the effects of variations in the
density of the treatment on schooling decisions at any given distance from each
village.10
More specifically, we consider the following linear regression model:
yi,l = α1Tl + α2N
t
d,l + α3N
e
d,l + i,d, (1)
where yi,l is a school participation indicator variable for child i in locality l and
Tl is the randomly assigned treatment indicator which denotes whether local-
ity l receives the program or not. The variables N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respec-
tively the number of treated and evaluation localities situated within distance
d from locality l. Individual disturbance terms i,d are likely to be correlated
10Miguel and Kremer [2004] employ a similar approach to study health externalities across
school districts in rural Kenya. Instead of relying on proximity between randomization units,
the effects of the local density of program delivery may be identified by randomizing ex ante this
density across different evaluation clusters. This area-level randomization is used, for instance,
by Cre´pon et al. [2011] in the context of a workfare program in France. To our knowledge, there
is no comparable data collected for social policies in developing countries.
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across groupings of neighboring localities, hence we cluster standard errors at
the neighborhood level.11,12
In this framework, α1 measures the direct treatment effect of the program
while α2 captures the spillover effect, on school participation, of an additional
beneficiary neighboring village. Identification of both parameters stems directly
from the randomized evaluation design of the program. In particular, the vari-
ations in treatment density in the surroundings of each village l generated by
the random treatment assignment assure that the estimator of the N tl,d term is an
unbiased estimate of program externalities across neighboring localities.
Formally, let yTi,l denote potential outcomes by treatment status T . Consis-
tent estimation of the α2 parameter relies on the following spatial conditional
independence property, implied by the randomized experiment:
E[yTi,l|N tl,d, N el,d] = E[yTi,l|N el,d], ∀T ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
The conditioning term N ed,l partly captures the effects of unobserved de-
terminants of the school participation decision which are correlated with the
program targeting mechanism. As this targeting is correlated with poverty, low
parental education and access to more congested schools (see Section 2), we
expect the estimate of α3 to be downward-biased. However, the bias in the N el,d
coefficient does not contaminate the estimate of the N tl,d term. In fact, the latter
is solely determined by the random selection of treatment and control villages
which is, by construction, orthogonal to any observable and unobservable in
equation (1).
Note that identification of the effects of program density is local in nature,
as the estimate of the α2 parameter is obtained for the villages that have other
evaluation localities in their neighborhoods (see Section 2). Besides, this param-
eter captures the effects of neighboring evaluation villages that are randomly
assigned to the program, and it does not necessarily extend to other program
beneficiary localities which are located nearby the villages in our sample.
As a validation test for our identifying assumption (2), we use data from the
11For ease of exposition, in this section we omit background characteristics at the household,
village, and neighborhood level. In the estimation, however, we do control for a set of observed
characteristics in order to improve precision.
12Even though our main dependent variable is dichotomous, we discuss and estimate linear
forms for simplicity of interpretation. We use probit estimates as a robustness check; see Table
A.2 in the Appendix.
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baseline collected in October 1997 and estimate equation (1) using as depen-
dent variables children’s schooling outcomes —primary and secondary school
enrollment, years of education attained and expected—and some of their deter-
minants at the household level, such as mother’s years of education and total
per capita income. Table 3 gives the OLS estimation results. As expected from
the random design of the evaluation, none of those variables are significantly
associated with either the village treatment assignment (Tl) or with the number
of nearby treated localities (N td,l).
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3.2 Endogenous versus Contextual Interactions
The next step is to investigate whether spatial externalities arise from interac-
tions that involve only program beneficiaries or from more general externalities
of treatment density, such as social interactions within pre-existing networks
(e.g., extended families), or changes in local markets (e.g. access to credit) and
in the supply of public goods (e.g., learning conditions in local schools). We
argue that, while such general externalities are likely to affect households and
children of both treatment and control localities, indirect effects restricted to
treatment villages should reveal interactions between beneficiaries.
In equation (1), local treatment density is orthogonal to village level treat-
ment, so that the indirect effect of the program can be identified for both treat-
ment and control group villages. This feature of our empirical framework allows
us to disentangle whether spatial externalities extend to the entire population or
affect exclusively the outcomes of children and families who are included in the
program, and thus test, in an indirect way, whether externalities arise because of
program-induced social interactions or due to other indirect effects of the local
density of program delivery.
More specifically, we evaluate whether the effects on school participation
of the local density of the program vary with the village-level treatment assign-
ment. We thus consider the following variant of equation (1):
yi,l = β1Tl + β2N
t
d,l + β3[N
t
d,l × Tl] + β4N ed,l + β5[N ed,l × Tl] + ui,d. (3)
13For consistency with our main estimates, we estimate those placebo regressions using a 5
kilometer radius (d = 5). Results (available upon request) are very similar when considering
larger radiuses.
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where village-level treatment (Tl) is interacted with the number of neighbor-
ing treatment localities (N td,l), but also with the number of neighboring evalu-
ation localities (N ed,l). This latter control warrants that conditional randomness
holds—see expression (2)—so that the effects of spatial externalities are identi-
fied separately for the control and treatment groups. In this equation, consistent
estimation of the β3 coefficient enables us to discriminate among possible expla-
nations underlying the indirect program effect. In particular, contextual effects
such as changes in local markets or in public infrastructures due to the pro-
gram are likely to affect the schooling behaviors of all children, regardless of
the treatment status of the village they reside in (β3 = 0). On the contrary, if
some of the program operations have shaped interaction networks and gener-
ated spillovers, then the local density of the treatment should mainly affect the
enrollment responses of beneficiaries (β3 > 0).
A complementary test of the hypothesis that program externalities are re-
stricted to program beneficiaries consists in estimating equation (1) separately
for the two groups of children that are respectively eligible and non-eligible
to receive the program. Ineligible households and children may differ in other
ways from the population targeted by the program, hence the resulting evidence
should be interpreted as suggestive. However, the finding of spillover effects
restricted to eligible children would corroborate the notion that interactions ex-
clusively involve program beneficiaries.
4 Results
In this section, we present the main findings obtained using the above empir-
ical strategy. We first document the estimates of both the direct and indirect
impacts of the program on schooling outcomes. We then report some evidence
suggesting that the externalities of the local density of the program are heteroge-
nous and affect exclusively program beneficiaries. Finally, we discuss a series
of specification checks.
4.1 Main Estimates
Table 4 reports OLS estimates, for the post-intervention period (1998–1999), of
the coefficients of equation (1). In column 1 we consider the sample of primary
15
school children. We find that living in a treated community increases enroll-
ment rates by 2.6 percentage points. However, there seems to be no additional
effects of having an additional program beneficiary village in a 5 kilometer ra-
dius. When we focus on the secondary school sample (column 2), consistently
with previous evaluation studies (e.g. Schultz [2004]), we find much larger
effects of the direct exposure to the program, with a 9.6 percentage points dif-
ference between treated and control children. Moreover, we find that a marginal
increase in the local density of the program increases secondary school enroll-
ment by 4.6 percentage points. This is a large effect. When normalized in
standard deviations of the number of treatment localities in a 5 kilometer radius
(0.72 for this sample), this indirect effect accounts for roughly one third (0.34
percent exactly) of the average treatment effect of the program.
In order to shed light on the geographic scope of those spatial externalities,
we introduce explanatory variables for the numbers of evaluation and treatment
group localities located at a distance between 5 and 10 kilometers in addition to
the corresponding variables within a 5-km radius. The results, reported in col-
umn 3, reveal no evidence of neighborhood effects over those larger distances.
The estimated parameter for the number of treatment group localities situated
at 5–10 kilometers is negative and statistically insignificant. This suggests that
interactions among program beneficiaries operate within very small areas sur-
rounding households’ place of residence.
Cross-village externalities are likely to increase with the share of the local
population that receives the program, but this relationship does not need to be
linear. To inspect this, we introduce quadratic terms of local treatment densities
in our specification. The results, reported in column 4, do not provide support
for the presence of non-linearities in our data. The estimated coefficient of the
quadratic term for the number of neighboring villages that are randomly as-
signed to the program is close to zero and not statistically different from zero.14
Given the marked pre-program differences in secondary school enrollment
rates between boys and girls (see Section 2), we further split the sample by
gender. The results, reported in columns 4 and 5, show that the local density
of the program boosts the secondary school enrollment of girls, while the effect
14This may be partly due to the small variation in the data beyond one neighboring village
(see Table 1).
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for boys is positive but not statistically significant.15
The estimates of the parameters for the density of nearby evaluation villages
are negative and significant for the sample of secondary school children. This
provides some evidence of the abovementioned downward bias, due to the geo-
graphic targeting of the program, in the estimates of treatment externalities that
would be obtained in the absence of an experimental design.
We next examine whether neighborhood externalities take place exclusively
among beneficiaries or instead affect the schooling outcomes of both benefi-
ciary and non beneficiary children. Table 5 reports the results for heterogeneity
in the effects of the density of the program by village-level treatment status
(see equation (3)). We find that program externalities matter only for children
who live in treatment group localities (column 1), with a point estimate for chil-
dren in control group localities that is statistically insignificant and close to zero
(column 2). The relative test in column 3 confirms that the effects for the two
samples are significantly different from each other at the 10 percent confidence
level. The point estimate in column 1 implies a substantial magnification effect
of the program. An increase of one standard deviation in the local density of
the treatment raises the secondary school enrollment rate of children who live
in program villages by 5.4 (0.72× 0.075) percentage points.
We also investigate whether externalities affect the schooling behaviors of
all children in a treated village, whether eligible to the program or not. The
results provided in column 4 do not support this hypothesis: there are no effects
of the density of neighboring beneficiaries on the enrollment of non-eligible
children. It thus appears that being entitled to receive the treatment, as opposed
to simply living in a treated village, is a key factor for the exposure to program
externalities in this setting.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The estimates of program externalities we have discussed so far do not take
into account the relative population sizes of the neighboring villages. Table 6
reports estimation results for the coefficients of equations (1) and (3) when us-
ing the number of program eligible households in neighboring villages as an
15The direct effect of the program is also higher for girls, which is consistent with previous
findings (see, e.g., Schultz [2004]).
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alternative definition of program density. The results match remarkably well the
previous ones in terms of both sign and magnitude across the various samples
and specifications. A one-standard deviation increase in the number of neigh-
boring program-eligible households leads to an additional 3.5 percentage points
increase in school enrollment rates for the whole sample of secondary school
children (column 1) and a 4.7 percentage points increase when we restrict the
sample to children who reside in treated villages (column 5).
As mentioned in Section 2, our main sample consists of all observations
of program-eligible child of primary and secondary school levels. Since the
sample includes children who start their primary schooling during the first post-
treatment evaluation period, it is subject to a potential bias due to the dynamic
selection into secondary school [Cameron and Heckman, 1998]. For checking
the robustness of our results, we reestimate our models using the longitudinal
database, thereby selecting our sample based on grade completed at baseline.
Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the corresponding estimates, which are very
much in line with those obtained from the pooled database.
Given the discrete nature of our dependent variable, one may wonder whether
the linear form we have imposed for estimation is the appropriate specification.
Table A.2 in the Appendix displays the probit estimates for the marginal effects
of the parameters of interest. Both direct and indirect treatment effects appear
slightly larger, yet they remain largely consistent with our preferred estimates
as discussed previously.
5 Interpretation
Our main estimates show that individual school participation decisions are not
only affected by the program’s benefits but also respond to the density of neigh-
boring beneficiaries. In addition, we do not find evidence of such program ex-
ternalities either for children who live in villages assigned to the control group
or for children who live in treated villages but are not eligible to receive the
program’s benefits. This suggests that the program has induced some form of
social interactions among the targeted population, thereby further enhancing
beneficiaries’ demand for schooling for children not yet enrolled.
In what follows, we seek to corroborate this evidence by considering an
intermediate outcome which is likely to affect schooling behaviors: aspirations
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of future educational attainment. We then discuss additional results which rule
out several alternative explanations for our findings.
5.1 Educational Aspirations
As documented in Section 2, many parents in this setting do not assign much
value to education and withdraw their children from school after primary school
or during junior secondary school. This is particularly true for girls. Parents’
aspirations for their children’s school attainment are very heterogeneous among
the targeted population. Before the program started, nearly half of them do not
wish for their children to pursue more than a junior secondary education. This
may explain why some beneficiaries choose not to enroll their children in school
in spite of the cash incentives provided by the program.
Periodic interactions with other beneficiaries in the context of some program-
related operations (i.e. health checks, school meetings, collection of transfers)
may enhance parents’ positive feelings about their children’s education. In this
sense, learning through social interactions about the positive experiences of suf-
ficiently close others can play an important role in the decision to take up sec-
ondary school scholarships.
We thus evaluate whether parental educational aspirations are sensitive to
the density of the program in village neighborhoods. Table 7 reports the re-
sults. When considering treated and control villages altogether, both direct and
indirect treatment effects are positive and significant only for girls (column 2).
An increase of one standard deviation in the number of treated localities in the
neighborhood increases parents’ desired attainments for their daughters by 0.2
years (0.77× 0.23), the standard deviation of the number of treatment localities
for the sample of children for which educational aspirations are reported being
0.77 , which corresponds to roughly the same increase in aspirations due to the
direct exposure to the program. In addition, here again, when we split the sam-
ple into treatment and control villages, we find that density matters only for the
schooling aspirations of program-eligible parents who live in treatment villages
(0.35 years), while the corresponding estimate is close to zero for those who
reside in control villages.
These findings suggest that the program has induced some social interactions
that have propagated higher aspirations for girls’ education among the targeted
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population, thereby further relaxing the conditionality constraint and persuading
some initially reluctant parents to enroll their daughters in school.
5.2 Context-Based Interactions
The nonresponse to a higher local density of program delivery of children in
control villages might a priori also be explained by some form of complemen-
tarity between liquidity constraints and social interactions taking place within
existing context-based networks of neighbors or relatives. Accordingly, it could
be that all children in our sample were sensitive to the changes, induced by the
program, in their neighbors’ behaviors, but that those children who do not re-
ceive the transfers were unable to adjust their enrollment decisions because of
liquidity constraints. This alternative explanation would be consistent with the
assumption of credit constraints embedded in the program design and the esti-
mates of its direct impacts. However, this argument is not compatible with the
finding that children of households who are not eligible for the program, who
are thus less credit constrained, do not respond to the externalities generated
by neighboring beneficiaries, as reported in column (4) of Table 5. An addi-
tional indirect test for the absence of such a complementarity is provided by
the results on educational aspirations. Provided that all individuals positively
respond to the schooling behaviors of peers, we should observe some positive
neighborhood effects on parental aspirations regarding future schooling among
nonbeneficiaries. However, here again, as reported in column (5) of Table 7,
we find no evidence of any effects of local treatment density on the educational
aspirations of parents residing in control villages.16
Another explanation related to existing context-based interactions - which is
however, not consistent with the heterogeneous impacts uncovered above - may
be that cash injections into the local economy might have altered the function-
ing of some markets and thereby affected households’ constraints and choices
beyond schooling [Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009]. We have inspected this
mechanism by evaluating whether program density in treated village neighbor-
16We have also investigated the presence of externalities for relatively richer households
in control group villages by splitting the sample according to the distribution of a composite
asset index for household wealth, and we have found no evidence of any statistically significant
effects on the schooling outcomes of the children of those households (results available upon
request).
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hoods is associated with a comprehensive set of market-related household vari-
ables, including total labor income, a dummy for access to (formal and informal)
credit, hours worked by the head of household in his or her main occupation, net
sales of agricultural products and working animals, and a composite price index
at the village-level based on 36 food commodities. Table A.3 in the Appendix
reports the results. There seem to be no statistically significant effects of the
local density of the program on these market-related economic outcomes.
5.3 Differences in Program Effectiveness
An alternative interpretation of our findings requires further scrutiny. Areas
with more numerous villages assigned to the treatment group might have been
better assisted by the program administration—for instance, through prompter
delivery of the cash transfers, more skilled local staff, or improvements in the
intervention’s supply side (e.g., increased school resources), thereby inducing
some complementarity between the effects of program receipt and local treat-
ment density.
If this were the case, our estimates would reflect the heterogeneity in pro-
gram impacts that are (positively) correlated with treatment density across vil-
lage clusters. In order to evaluate the possibility of differences in program ef-
fectiveness across areas, we combine objective and subjective measures of ef-
ficiency. First, we use administrative data on transfer payments made during
the experimental period to compute the number of months since incorporation
after which the first disbursements were made to the localities assigned to the
treatment group. While the food stipend was distributed to all villages at the
same time in March 1998, there was substantial variation in the delivery of
scholarships and school supplies across localities. Thus, only 56 percent of the
treated localities received the first scholarship transfer in March 1998, 36 per-
cent received them two months later, and the remaining 8 percent not before six
months after incorporation into the program.
Second, we consider the answers elicited from beneficiary households, in
March 1999, to a set of survey questions on the perceived quality of program
implementation. This survey included the following measures: a dummy vari-
able indicating whether or not eligible children received the form for school
attendance monitoring (E1 form), a dummy variable indicating whether or not
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the job performed by the local staff member (i.e., promotora) was satisfactory,
and a composite index intended to capture the overall perceived effectiveness of
the program in accomplishing its objectives.
We thus re-estimate equation (1) using these indicators as outcome variables.
Table 8 reports the results. As documented in columns 1 and 2, administrative
delays seem more frequent in some states, and notably in Queretaro and San
Luis Potosi. However, this variation is not related to treatment density in the
surroundings of the evaluation villages. From the perspective of beneficiaries,
the only outcome that appears to be positively and significantly related to exper-
imental variation in treatment density is receipt of the E1 form.17
We further investigate the presence of any effects of treatment density on
local schooling conditions, although those effects would likely affect both ben-
eficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and thus seem incompatible with the finding of
spillover effects restricted to beneficiaries. For this purpose, we complement the
survey information on the quality of the schools attended by beneficiaries with
a secondary school census in order to construct objective neighborhood-specific
measures of the program’s school supply-side component both before and after
intervention. Table A.4 in the Appendix displays the results. None of those in-
dicators of local supply of education is statistically significantly related to our
measure of program density in village neighborhoods.18
6 Conclusions
We have exploited the dense coverage of the Progresa program in rural areas
and its experimental evaluation design to assess and quantify the effects of the
local density of the policy treatment on school participation decisions. We found
evidence of a substantial magnification effect of the program: an increase of one
standard deviation in the number of beneficiaries in the surroundings of each
village increases enrollment rates of treated children by 5.4 percentage points.
17As a further check that program effectiveness is not driving our results, we have re-
estimated our school enrollment model while using as an additional control variable receipt
of the E1 form. Results (available upon request) are consistent with previous findings on the
positive and significant effect of receipt of the E1 form [de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011]. Yet,
the estimated coefficient for the effect of program density remains unchanged.
18Because our interest here centers on the difference in supply conditions before and after
the program, in these estimates we also control for the values of the education supply indicators
at baseline.
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However, we found no evidence of externalities of neighboring beneficiaries on
the school outcomes of children who do not receive the program.
This striking result that program density affects exclusively children who are
included in the program, coupled with complementary evidence of similar ex-
ternalities on educational aspirations, suggests that the intervention has induced
some form of social interactions between beneficiaries residing in neighboring
localities. Due to the multiple and unbundled components of the program’s
design, such intervention-based interactions have apparently encouraged some
beneficiaries to take up the educational component of the program.
This evidence of spillovers on beneficiaries can inform policy in two main
ways. First, it suggests that interventions can be made more effective by increas-
ing the opportunities for information sharing and interactions between benefi-
ciaries. In this sense, integrated social policies have the potential, by offering
some benefits with no or limited conditionality, to increase the take-up of some
other components that involve more binding constraints. Second, the targeting
mechanism is key for the effectiveness of interventions of this sort. Social mul-
tipliers arise when the local number of recipients is sufficiently large, so that
the overall effect of the policy will be greater when many households within the
same area are included in the program.
From a methodological viewpoint, interactions between neighboring recip-
ients can threaten the extrapolation of policy parameters obtained from evalua-
tion studies that rely on few and isolated units of analysis. Our findings suggest
that a more accurate assessment of the impacts of those interventions should
seek to capture the externalities that would occur in a broader implementation
of the policy and be based on data from geographic clusters of neighboring units.
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Table 1: Village Neighborhoods. Evaluation Sample
5 km radius 10 km radius 20 km radius
(1) (2) (3)
Any Evaluation Locality 0.403 0.791 0.955
(0.491) (0.407) (0.208)
Conditional Distributions (for the sub-sample of villages with at least one
neighborhing evaluation locality)
Number of Evaluation Localities 1.451 2.960 7.917
(0.855) (2.323) (5.998)
Number of Treatment Localities 0.907 1.890 4.981
(0.839) (1.702) (4.054)
One Treatment Locality 0.549 0.405 0.118
(0.498) (0.492) (0.323)
Two Treatment Localities 0.113 0.205 0.147
(0.317) (0.404) (0.354)
Three or More Treatment Localities 0.034 0.260 0.714
(0.182) (0.439) (0.452)
NOTE: This table reports unconditional and conditional means and standard deviations
(in parenthesis) for the presence and relative frequency of other neighboring evaluation
villages within areas delimited by 5, 10 and 20 kilometers radiuses around each evaluation
locality. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
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Table 2: Baseline Characteristics and Proximity Between Evaluation Villages
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Per-capita household income 219.3 212.7 245.3 204.6
(182.1) (206.9) (194.7) (139.2)
Mother’s years of education 1.28 1.57 1.07 1.06
(2.19) (2.40) (2.11) (2.10)
Marginality index 0.371 0.374 0.485 0.671
(0.78) (0.75) (0.69) (0.68)
Secondary school in the village 0.183 0.167 0.137 0.149
(0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.36)
Student/teacher in nearby schools 19.9 21.2 23.1 26.1
(6.5) (11.1) (10.5) (8.0)
Student/class in nearby schools 21.4 21.3 23.5 26.1
(8.6) (7.3) (7.7) (7.0)
NOTE: This table reports means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for various covariates of
poverty across quartiles of the distribution of the number of evaluation localities in 5-kilometer neigh-
borhoods around each village in our sample. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced
census of localities.
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Table 3: Placebo Test. Baseline Data
Enroll Enroll Attainment Educational Mother PC HH
Primary Secondary Aspirations Education Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tl 0.015 0.027 0.005 0.031 0.064 -0.126
(0.010) (0.028) (0.039) (0.042) (0.140) (0.124)
N t5,l 0.005 0.006 0.015 -0.008 0.025 -0.034
(0.013) (0.034) (0.049) (0.057) (0.210) (0.135)
N e5,l 0.012 0.010 0.031 -0.003 0.105 0.003
(0.010) (0.025) (0.044) (0.041) (0.158) (0.090)
Number of Obs 11805 5628 17548 10478 3682 3685
R-squared 0.006 0.025 0.005 0.038 0.047 0.082
Nb of Clusters 380 372 381 375 371 371
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level. The variable Tl denotes
the village-level program treatment indicator. The variables N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the
number of evaluation and treated localities situated within distance d from locality l. State dum-
mies included but not reported. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of
localities.
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Table 4: Direct and Indirect Program Impacts on School Enrollment
Sample Primary School Secondary School
Girls Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tl 0.026*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.111*** 0.082***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
N t5,l -0.008 0.046** 0.036** 0.059* 0.058** 0.031
(0.008) (0.020) (0.017) (0.030) (0.028) (0.021)
N t10−5,l -0.017
(0.020)
(N t5,l)
2 -0.007
(0.008)
N e5,l 0.010* -0.035** -0.032** -0.064*** -0.042* -0.027
(0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017)
N e10−5,l 0.017
(0.014)
(N e5,l)
2 0.009**
(0.004)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 23848 13981 13981 13981 6780 7201
R-squared 0.319 0.264 0.263 0.265 0.260 0.270
Number of Clusters 382 379 188 379 369 371
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level. The variable Tl denotes the
village-level program treatment indicator. The variables N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the number of
evaluation and treated localities situated within distance d from locality l. Baseline control variables include:
child’s gender and age, parental education, distance to the nearest city, the share of eligible households and
the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population, the number of localities, the mean degree
of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Sources: Progresa evaluation
surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Program Externalities on School Enrollment
Sample Treated Control All Treated - Non eligibles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N t5,l 0.075*** 0.002 -0.002 0.030
(0.025) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039)
N t5,l × Tl 0.080*
(0.044)
Tl 0.092***
(0.023)
N e5,l -0.057** -0.004 -0.009 -0.038
(0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032)
N e5,l × Tl -0.047
(0.037)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs 8807 5174 13981 2381
R-squared 0.289 0.227 0.265 0.302
Nb of Clusters 266 160 379 211
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level. The
variable Tl denotes the village-level program treatment indicator. The variables
N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the number of evaluation and treated localities
situated within distance d from locality l. Baseline control variables include:
child’s gender and age, parental education, distance to the nearest city, the share
of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total
population, the number of localities and the mean degree of marginalization in the
radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Sources: Progresa evaluation
surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
31
Table 6: Eligible Households in Neighboring Villages
Sample All All Girls Boys Treated Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tl 0.0975*** 0.0977*** 0.1127*** 0.0831***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
N t5,l 0.0016** 0.0016** 0.0022*** 0.0011 0.0020*** 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N t10−5,l -0.0004
(0.000)
N e5,l -0.0011* -0.0011* -0.0015** -0.0007 -0.0012* -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N e10−5,l 0.0003
(0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 13981 13981 6780 7201 8807 5174
R-squared 0.265 0.265 0.261 0.270 0.289 0.227
Number of Localities 379 379 369 371 266 160
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the locality level. The variable Tl denotes the village-
level program treatment indicator. The variables N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the number of evalu-
ation and treated program eligible households situated within distance d from locality l. Baseline control
variables include: child’s gender and age, parental education, distance to the nearest city, the share of el-
igible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population, the number of
schools and localities, the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for
year 1998. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
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Table 7: Parental Aspirations for Educational Attainments
Sample All Girls Boys Treated Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tl 0.123 0.231** 0.024
(0.085) (0.102) (0.097)
N t5,l 0.185* 0.229* 0.141 0.455*** -0.141
(0.105) (0.127) (0.120) (0.117) (0.176)
N e5,l -0.128 -0.174** -0.089 -0.298*** 0.083
(0.090) (0.085) (0.126) (0.113) (0.144)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs 8356 3896 4460 5485 2871
R-squared 0.051 0.053 0.050 0.058 0.065
Nb of Clusters 373 352 361 261 157
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level.
Outcome is expected educational attainment in years. The variable Tl de-
notes the village-level program treatment indicator. The variables N td,l and
Ned,l indicate respectively the number of evaluation and treated localities sit-
uated within distance d from locality l. Baseline control variables include:
child’s gender and age, parental education, distance to the nearest city, the
share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the
locality; total population, the number of localities and the mean degree of
marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998.
Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of locali-
ties.
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Table 8: Program Effectiveness and Treatment Density
Delays in Transfers Program Receipt Quality of
Scholarship School Supplies Effectiveness of E1 Form Promotora
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N td,l -0.222 0.227 0.022 0.040** 0.027
(0.203) (0.352) (0.043) (0.017) (0.024)
Ned,l 0.129 -0.433 -0.000 -0.011 -0.020
(0.195) (0.396) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022)
Hidalgo -0.170 -0.112 -0.268*** 0.150*** 0.112*
(0.578) (0.569) (0.047) (0.029) (0.064)
Michoacan -0.844 -1.002 -0.167*** 0.149*** 0.200***
(0.539) (0.866) (0.055) (0.030) (0.065)
Puebla 0.894* 1.426 -0.177*** 0.118*** 0.210***
(0.515) (1.812) (0.064) (0.029) (0.067)
Queretaro 1.752** -0.942 -0.110** 0.147*** 0.130*
(0.696) (0.657) (0.054) (0.040) (0.067)
San Luis Potosi 1.239** -0.594 -0.047 0.137*** 0.085
(0.530) (0.399) (0.044) (0.029) (0.071)
Veracruz -0.633 0.821* -0.087* 0.141*** 0.186***
(0.569) (0.435) (0.051) (0.032) (0.059)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs 627 627 6114 4988 5819
R-squared 0.274 0.052 0.062 0.022 0.045
Nb of Clusters 264 264 260 260 260
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level. The variables
N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the number of evaluation and treated localities situated
within distance d from locality l. Excluded category for state dummies is Guerrero. Baseline
control variables include: distance to the nearest city, the share of eligible households and the
presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population, the number of localities and
the mean degree of marginalization in the radius. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and
geo-referenced census of localities.
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Appendix - not for publication
Table A.1: Panel Sample
Sample All All Girls Boys Treated Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tl 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.110*** 0.091***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
N t5,l 0.042** 0.038* 0.066** 0.015 0.084*** -0.016
(0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
N t10−5,l -0.012
(0.013)
N e5,l -0.031* -0.032* -0.046** -0.014 -0.067*** 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024)
N e10−5,l 0.013
(0.010)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 11890 11890 5835 6055 7410 4480
R-squared 0.251 0.252 0.244 0.261 0.258 0.240
Number of Localities 367 367 361 356 257 155
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level. The variable Tl denotes
the village-level program treatment indicator. The variables N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the
number of evaluation and treated localities situated within distance d from locality l. Baseline control
variables include: child’s gender and age, parental education, distance to the nearest city, the share
of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population, the
number of schools and localities, the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and
a dummy for year 1998. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
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Table A.2: Probit Estimates
Sample All All Girls Boys Treated Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tl 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.107***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
N t5,l 0.054** 0.049* 0.066* 0.040 0.094***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.034) (0.027) (0.030)
N t10−5,l -0.017
(0.016)
N e5,l -0.043** -0.045** -0.050* -0.034 -0.071**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028)
N e10−5,l 0.018
(0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs 13981 13981 6780 7201 8807 2451
Pseudo R-squared 0.225 0.226 0.217 0.236 0.253 0.205
Nb of Clusters 379 379 369 371 266 55
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
NOTE: Probit marginal effects reported. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level.
The variable Tl denotes the village-level program treatment indicator. The variables N td,l and
Ned,l indicate respectively the number of evaluation and treated localities situated within distance
d from locality l. Baseline control variables include: child’s gender and age, parental education,
distance to the nearest city, the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary
school in the locality; total population, the number of schools and localities, the mean degree
of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Sources: Progresa
evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
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Table A.3: Market Interactions in the Neighborhood. Treated Sample
Labor Access to Hours worked Sales of agri Net sales of Aggregate
income credit per-week products animals price index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N t5,l 0.061 0.003 0.054 -0.437 0.002 -0.153
(0.112) (0.006) (0.059) (0.342) (0.008) (0.151)
N e5,l -0.085 0.001 -0.023 0.502 0.003 0.080
(0.104) (0.004) (0.039) (0.372) (0.008) (0.123)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs 14699 14058 5889 5374 10686 13960
R-squared 0.064 0.028 0.050 0.009 0.003 0.101
Nb of Clusters 267 267 267 252 267 267
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level. Outcome is expected edu-
cational attainment in years. The variable Tl denotes the village-level program treatment indicator. The
variables N td,l and N
e
d,l indicate respectively the number of evaluation and treated localities situated within
distance d from locality l. Baseline control variables include: parental education, distance to the nearest
city, the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total popula-
tion, the number of localities and the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a
dummy for year 1998. Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities.
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Table A.4: School Characteristics in the Neighborhood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nb of schools Children/Class Children/Teacher Share Failed School Index
N td,l 0.089 0.049 0.356 0.002 -0.012
(0.056) (0.432) (0.455) (0.003) (0.042)
Ned,l -0.072* -0.212 -0.380 -0.000 -0.023
(0.038) (0.383) (0.341) (0.004) (0.033)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs 1012 925 926 926 5024
R-squared 0.942 0.570 0.449 0.567 0.027
Nb of Clusters 383 348 348 348 260
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the Neighborhood level. The variables N td,l and
Ned,l indicate respectively the number of evaluation and treated localities situated within distance d
from locality l. Control variables include: the relative school-supply outcome in 1997 (except for col-
umn 5), distance to the nearest city, total population in the radius, the mean degree of marginalization
of localities and the number of localities in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998.
Sources: Progresa evaluation surveys, geo-referenced census of localities, and Ministry of Education
census of secondary schools.
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